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Return-to-libc attack
Results: 45

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21	Q: Exploit Hardening Made Easy Edward J. Schwartz, Thanassis Avgerinos and David Brumley Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA {edmcman, thanassis, dbrumley}@cmu.edu Add to Reading List Source URL: users.ece.cmu.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-05-29 15:38:01 C Standard Library Return-to-libc attack Address space layout randomization Buffer overflow GADGET MOV Shellcode NX bit Instruction selection Computer architecture Computing Software bugs
22	doi:[removed][removed]The idea is to identify security-critical software bugs so they can be fixed first. By Thanassis Avgerinos, Sang Kil Cha, Alexandre Rebert, Edward J. Schwartz, Maverick Woo, and David Brumle Add to Reading List Source URL: users.ece.cmu.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-05-29 15:38:01 Software quality Software testing Shellcode Buffer overflow Arbitrary code execution Heap overflow Address space layout randomization Fuzz testing Return-to-libc attack Computer security Cyberwarfare Software bugs
23	Q: Exploit Hardening Made Easy Edward J. Schwartz, Thanassis Avgerinos and David Brumley Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA {edmcman, thanassis, dbrumley}@cmu.edu Add to Reading List Source URL: users.ece.cmu.edu Language: English - Date: 2011-06-28 13:43:18 C Standard Library Return-to-libc attack Address space layout randomization Buffer overflow GADGET MOV Shellcode NX bit Instruction selection Computer architecture Computing Software bugs
24	Chapter 1 Chapter 1 Introduction Even though memory corruption vulnerabilities are inherent to C, this language is Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cs.vu.nl Language: English - Date: 2013-04-18 05:57:24 Cyberwarfare Buffer overflow Stack buffer overflow PaX Memory safety Return-to-libc attack Address space layout randomization Stack Zero-day attack Software bugs Computer security Computing
25	Q: Exploit Hardening Made Easy Edward J. Schwartz, Thanassis Avgerinos and David Brumley Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA {edmcman, thanassis, dbrumley}@cmu.edu Add to Reading List Source URL: users.ece.cmu.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-12-17 15:18:11 C Standard Library Return-to-libc attack Address space layout randomization Buffer overflow Software engineering GADGET MOV Shellcode NX bit Computing Software bugs Computer architecture
26	ROP PRIMER BY @BARREBAS // CTF-TEAM.VULNHUB.COM CONTENTS Add to Reading List Source URL: speakerd.s3.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2015-03-04 17:01:47 Computer errors Software engineering Buffer overflow Shellcode Return-to-libc attack X86 assembly language Stack Segmentation fault Stack buffer overflow Computing Software bugs Software quality
27	Protecting Against Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Compromises and Return-to-Libc Attacks Using Network Intrusion Detection Systems DAY, David and ZHAO, Zhengxu Available from Sheffield Hallam University Resear Add to Reading List Source URL: shura.shu.ac.uk Language: English - Date: 2013-08-02 00:42:29 Software bugs Computer errors Stack buffer overflow Return-to-libc attack Address space layout randomization PaX Buffer overflow OpenBSD Stack Computing Software engineering Computer programming
28	Smashing the stack, an example from 2013 by Benjamin Randazzo August 2013 Stack overflow vulnerabilities have been made harder and harder to exploit over the years as Add to Reading List Source URL: www.exploit-db.com Language: English X86 architecture Computer errors X86 instructions Assembly languages Stack buffer overflow X86 MOV Return-to-libc attack Stack Computing Computer architecture Software engineering
29	Payload already inside: data re-use for ROP exploits Add to Reading List Source URL: media.blackhat.com Language: English - Date: 2012-04-07 14:53:12 C Standard Library Computer errors Stack buffer overflow Return-to-libc attack Address space layout randomization Buffer overflow MOV X86 Printf format string Computing Computer architecture Software bugs
30	Hacking Blind Andrea Bittau, Adam Belay, Ali Mashtizadeh, David Mazi`eres, Dan Boneh Stanford University Abstract—We show that it is possible to write remote stack buffer overflow exploits without possessing a copy of Add to Reading List Source URL: www.scs.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-05-19 16:48:47 Software quality Stack buffer overflow Address space layout randomization Buffer overflow protection Return-to-libc attack Buffer overflow Stack Shellcode FALSE Computing Software bugs Software engineering

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